Bolivian Instability Could Force U.N. Intervention
Por stratfor - Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003 at 10:37 AM

Regardless of Mesa's difficulties and his commitment to free-market democracy, the U.S. administration likely will not pay much attention to events in La Paz unless radical Islamist groups begin to operate in Bolivia and the Andes region.

Bolivian Instability Could Force U.N. Intervention
October 27, 2003 0038 GMT

Summary

Tensions appear to have eased significantly in Bolivia since new President Carlos Mesa replaced ousted President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada on Oct. 17. However, appearances in Bolivia are deceiving. It is likely that soon after mid-January 2004 Mesa will confront renewed waves of social unrest in La Paz and elsewhere that will hasten the end of his own interim presidency. This could plunge Bolivia into a lengthy period of instability that could spread to some neighboring countries and eventually force international intervention to restore order.

Analysis

Bolivian indigenous leaders have given new President Carlos Mesa 90 days to respond to their demands for major economic and political reforms. These include rejecting the free-market economic policies Bolivia has followed since 1985, ending the U.S.-backed program to eradicate coca in that country, rolling back recently approved tax increases and reforming the country's energy law to nearly triple the tax bite on foreign oil companies.

Mesa cannot realistically comply with any of these demands without aggravating landlocked Bolivia's commercial and political isolation. As a result, it virtually is certain that Mesa will face a popular revolt early in 2004 that could force his resignation and plunge Bolivia into ungovernable chaos.

If Mesa is forced to resign in 2004, it's possible that a radical indigenous leader like Evo Morales could become president. However, Morales would not survive long either, because popular revolt from lowland Bolivians likely would erupt if Morales tried to turn Bolivia's back on free trade and economic engagement with the United States -- which he would probably do within days.

The conflict that brought Mesa to power is rooted in deep class differences between poor highland Bolivians, the Kollas, and lowland Bolivians, the Cambas. Kollas tend to be mostly of indigenous ancestry, while the Cambas descend mainly from European immigrants. Viewed on a map, Kollas predominate in such highland cities as La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba, while Cambas reside in lowland regions such as Santa Cruz, Beni and Tarija -- where rich gas reserves earmarked for eventual export to the U.S. West Coast are located.

The conflict between Kollas and Cambas has simmered in Bolivia since at least the 1830s. Though differences between them are rooted partially in race or ethnicity, profound ideological and philosophical divides also exist. Kollas tend to believe in big government -- state control of exportable commodities and government intervention in economic activity. In contrast, Cambas believe in private enterprise and entrepreneurship -- disdaining big government. Kollas oppose initiatives like the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), while Cambas see the FTAA as a golden opportunity to insert Bolivia into the U.S. economy.

If Mesa's interim presidency becomes unsustainable in early 2004 because of renewed popular revolt, it also is possible that some adventurous military officers could attempt to seize power through a coup. Normally the military would be the final arbiter of conflict, seeking to fill a power vacuum should Bolivia become ungovernable. However, Bolivia's military leaders are as divided as the rest of the country between so-called traditionalists with ties to the old political establishment and populist younger officers who oppose free market and other policies that are perceived to aggravate Bolivia's poverty.

Confusing matters further -- currently, no individual military leader appears to have sufficient appeal both inside and outside the armed forces to seize and hold political power. Moreover, Kolla and Camba sources in La Paz and Santa Cruz -- who are diametrically opposed to each other on virtually every issue -- agreed in separate conversations with Stratfor that if the military tries to seize power, there would be a national revolt against the new military regime.

If Mesa is toppled and Bolivia becomes increasingly ungovernable, it's possible that the instability could spread to neighboring countries with large impoverished indigenous populations, such as in Ecuador and Peru. In fact, some indigenous groups in Peru and Ecuador have taken heart from recent developments in Bolivia to ratchet up their own agendas against the governments of Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutierrez.

It's also likely that increasingly violent class warfare tactics could spread from Bolivia to neighboring Brazil, which has the largest poor population in Latin America. In effect, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has good reason to be concerned about Bolivia's growing social turmoil and political instability.

Right now Da Silva is riding a wave of personal popularity that former Bolivian President Sanchez de Lozada never enjoyed. However, da Silva is under increasing social and political pressure to boost Brazilian economic growth significantly -- over five percent annually from its present sluggish average growth of about 1.5 percent a year. If Brazil remains in the economic doldrums for another year and the Bolivian class conflict starts to spread to neighboring countries, radical groups in Brazil's impoverished western states could decide to adopt similar tactics as well.

This Brazilian concern explains why da Silva has already stepped up to the plate. Besides forgiving Bolivia's external debts to Brazil and granting Bolivia $600 million in assistance over the next three years, Da Silva likely will exert Brazil's influence in the United Nations -- where it joins the Security Council on Jan.1, 2004 -- to pressure for greater international support for Bolivia. Moreover, if the Bolivian conflict becomes uncontrollable and Mesa is ousted, Brazil may ask the U.N. to take an active role in restoring order.

It's also likely that both Mesa and da Silva will urge the U.S. administration to become more actively involved in ending Bolivia's crisis before it infects other South American countries. However, Washington denied aid requests from Sanchez de Lozada barely a year ago, and likely will reject Mesa's pleas for a substantial jump in U.S. economic assistance.

In fact, the U.S. is already undermining Mesa's chances of remaining president for more than a few months. Over the weekend, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia David Greenlee announced that the country is not a good place to invest right now because of the heightened political risks it faces following Sanchez de Lozada's resignation.

Greenlee also declared that Washington would not give up its aggressive policies to eradicate coca completely in Bolivia. The implications are that more tensions are soon likely between the U.S. government and more than 35,000 indigenous coca growers in Bolivia -- with Mesa's fragile presidency sandwiched between them.

Regardless of Mesa's difficulties and his commitment to free-market democracy, the U.S. administration likely will not pay much attention to events in La Paz unless radical Islamist groups begin to operate in Bolivia and the Andes region.

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que basura
Por Bolivariano - Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003 at 11:31 AM

Evo es Bolivariano. Jamás nos traicionará. Como dice ahí arriba.

Este texto es una verdadera basura propagandística de la CIA.

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Por nunca digas nunca - Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003 at 12:12 PM

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